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The Framework
Current approaches to mobile code safety, inspired by the technique of Proof-Canyin,g Code (PCC) [15] , associate safety information in the form of a certificate to programs. The certificate (or proof) is created by the code supplier at compile time, and packaged along with the untrusted code. The consumer who receives the code-tcertificate package can then run a checker which by a straightforward inspection of the code and the certificak, can verify the validity of the certificate and thus compliance with bhe safety policy. The key benefit of this approach is that the burden of ensuring compliance with the desired safety policy is shifted from the consumer to the supplier. Indeed the (proof) checker performs a task that should he much simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating the original certificate. For instance, in the first PCC system [15] , the certificate is originally a proof in first-order logic of certain verification conditions and the checking process involves ensuring t,hat the certificate is indeed a valid first-order The main practical difficulty of PCC techniques is in generating safety certificates which at the same time: i) allow expressing interesting safety pmperties, ii) can be generated automatically and, iii) are easy and eficient to check. In [l] , the abstract interpretation techniques [5] developed in logic programming' are proposed as a basis for PCC. They offer a number of advantages for dealing with the aforementioned issues. In particular, the expressiveuess of existing abstract domains will be implicitly available in abstract interpretation-based code certification to define a wide range of safety properties. Furthermore, the approach inherits the automation and inference power of the abstract interpretation engines used in (Constraint) Logic Programming, (C)LP.
Certification in the Supplier
In Fig. 1 , we illustrate the certification process of [l] carried out to generate a safety certificate by the code supplier. It is based on the idea that a particular subset of th.e analysis results computed b y abstract interpretation-based b o i n t algorithmscan play the role of certificate for attesting program safety [l] . The certification process consists in the next four steps. Safety Policy. A subset of the high-level assertion language of [16] is used to define the safety policy in the context of CLP programs. Assertions are syntactic objects which allow us t.o express "abstract"-i.e. symbolic-properties over different abstract domains. Examples are assertions which state information on entry points to a program module, assertions which describe properties of built-ins, assertions which provide some type declarations, cost bounds, etc. The certification process starts from an initial program and an abstract domain and obtains a set of safety assertions from the predefined assertions for system predicates and those provided by the user. The Safety Policy consists in euaranteeing t,hat safety assertions hold for the given 
Validation in the Consumer
The validation process of [l] performed by the code consumer is similar to the certification process described in Fig. 1 by replacing the fmpoint analyzer by an Analysis Checker. Indeed, the supplier sends the program together with the certificate to the consumer and, to retain the safety guarantees, the consumer can trust neither the code nor the certificate. Thus, in the validation process, a code consumer not only checks the validity of the answer table hut it also (re)generates a trustworthy verification condition, as it is done by the supplier in the ahove figure.
The whole validation process is centered around the following observation: the checking algorithm can be defined as a very simplified "one-pass' analyzer ll]. Intuitively since the certification process already provides the fixpoint result as certificate, an additional analysis pass over it cannot change the result. Thus, a s long as the answer table is valid, one single execution of the abstract int.erpreter validates the certificate. The definition of the checker can be found in [l] .
Experiments in CiaoPP
The above abstract interpretation-based code certification framework has been implemented in CiaoPP [ll] : the preprocessor of the Ciao program development system [3] . Ciao is a multi-paradigm programming system, allowing programming in logic, constraint, and functional styles. At the heart of Ciao is an efficient logic programming-based kernel language. This allows the use of the very large body of approximation domains, inference techniques and tools for abstract interpretationbased semantic analysis which have been developed to a powerful and mature level in this area (see, e.g., [14,4, 9, 121 and their references). These techniques and systems can approximate at compile-time, always safely, and with a significance degree of precision, a wide range of properties which is much richer than, for example, traditional types. This includes data structure shape (including pointer sharing), independence, hounds on data structure sizes, and other operational variable instantiation properties as well as procedure-level properties such as determinacy, termination, non-failure and hounds on resource consumption (time or space cost). The lat,ter tasks are performed in an integrated fashion in CiaoPP.
In the context of CiaoPP, the abstract interpretationbased certification system is implemented in Ciao l . l l # Z O O [3] with compilation t o bytecode. In essence, we have used the efficient, highly optimized, state-oft.he-art analysis system of CiaoPP (which is part of a working compiler) as fixpoint analyzer for generating safety certificates. The checker has been implemented also as a simplification of such generic abstract interpreter. Our aim here is to present not the techniques used by CiaoPP for code cert.ification (which are described in [l]) but its main functionalities by means of some examples. One of the distinguishing features of logic programming is that arguments to procedures can be uninstantiated variables. This, together with the search execution mechanism available (generally backtracking) makes it possible to have multi-directional procedures. I.e., rather than having fixed input and output arguments, execution can be "reversed". Thus, we may compute the "inputii arguments fmm known "output" arguments. However, predicate i s / 2 (used as an infix binary operator) is mono-directional. It computes the arithmetic value of its second (right) argument and unifies it with its first (left) argument. The execution of i s with an uninstantiation rightmost argument results in a run-time error. Therefore, a safety issue in this example is to ensure that calls to the built-in predicate is are performed with ground data in the right argument. We can infer this safety information by analyzing the above program in CiaoPP using a mode and independence analysis ("sharingifreeness")). In the "sharing-tfreeness" domain, var denotes variables that do not point yet to any data structure, mshare denotes pointer sharing patterns between variables and ground variables which point to data structures which contain no pointers. The analysis is performed with the following entry assertion which allows specifying a restricted class of calls to the predicate.
:-e n t r y mmultiply(X,Y,Z): ( var(Z), ground(X), ground(Y1 1.
I t denotes that calls to mmultiply will be performed with ground terms in the Jrst two arguments and a free variable in the last one.
FOT the above entry, the output of CiaoPP yields, among others, the following set of assertions which constitute OUT safety certificate:
: -t r u e pred A is B+C The t r u e pred" assertions above specify in a combined way properties of both: ' I : " the entry (i.e., upon calling) and ">" the exit (i.e., upon success) points of all calls to the predicate. These assertions for predicate i s express that the leftmost argument is a free unaliased variable while the rightmost arguments are input values (i.e., ground on call) when is is called (:). Upon success, all three arguments will get instantiated. Given this information, we can verify that the safety condition is accomplished and thus the code is safe to run. Thus, the aboue a,nalysis output can be used as a certijkate to attest a safe use of predicate is.
The above experiment has been performed using a s h aing+freeness domain. However, the whole method is domain-independent. This allows plugging in different abstract domains, provided suitahle interfacing functions are defined. From the user point of view, it is sufficient t o specify the particular abstract domain desired. For instance, CiaoPP can also infer (parametric) 
i s t (term).

The program is analyzed w.T.t. the following e n t r y assertion which specifies that calls to m u l t i p l y art performed with matrices an the first two arguments:
:-e n t r y multiply(X,Y,Z): (var(Z),
list(X,list(num)),list(Y,list(num))).
CiaoPP output yields, among other, the following assertions for the built-in predicate is:
:-t r u e pred A is B+C : ( term(A),num(B),num(C) ) => ( num(A),num(B),num(C) 1 .
: -t r u e pred A is B+C : ( term(A),num(B),num(C) )
=> ( num(A) ,num(B) ,num(C) 1 . 
Applications in Pervasive Computing
Pervasive computing platforms are becoming ever smaller and more powerful, and are embedded everywhere, even in living organisms. They can contain sophisticated models of our personal environment that help us to make everyday decisions; they have the power to do mathematical and logical reasoning in order to perform intelligent tasks. As a result, verification and validation techniques have to keep pace with the huge requirements for intelligent, user-oriented applications that must run on devices with a minimnm of computing resources. In this context, there is a large number of computing devices which may range from personal computers to PDAs, mobile phones, dedicated processors, smart cards, wearable computers and such like. Such devices are often characterized by having a relatively small amount of computing resources [19] . As a result, time eficrency is an issue since often these devices have to operate on real-time tasks. Also, and possibly more importantly, memory efficiency is an issue. If either the software used is too large to fit in the device or needs too much memory to run, then it is simply not possible to use such software.
Abstract interpretation-based techniques are ahle to reason about computational properties which can be useful for controlling efficiency issues in the context of pervasive computing systems. For instance, CiaoPP can infer lower and upper bounds on the sizes of terms and the computational cost of predicates [7: 81. Cost bounds are expressed as functions on the sizes of the input arguments and yield the number of resolution steps. Various measures can be used for the "size" of the input, such as list-length, term-size; term-depth, integer-value, etc. The idea is that the system can disregard code which makes requirement that are too large in terms of computing resources (in time and/or space). Let ns see an example. Therefore, the status of the last three check assertions has become checked, which means that they have been validated and thus the program is safe to run (accoding to the intended meaning). The last procedure-leuel assertion merges them all and, additionally, indicates that calls to the predicate do not fail and their execution is deterministic by combining information available for Other abstract domains.
Apart from expressing relevant properties, when developing software for deployment on Smart Cards (and similar ambient computing devices), two more important issues arise: 1) Pervasive computing is characterized by having a relatively large number of untrusted computing devices which interact. Thus, when modeling such a system, it is not realistic to consider one device in isolation: it will receive plenty of mobile data from the environment. In this context, the safety of the deployed softmare is crucial, as the cost of recalling unfit devices can be prohibitive.
2) It is essential to simplify the (safety) verification process and reduce its resource usage. Indeed, Smart Cards typically provide less than 4Kb of RAM while it is possible to use only up to 128Kb for storing the application and static data. Such resource considerations tend to dominate the development prcess for pervasive systems, forcing developers to write low-level code from scratch, as mobile system developers have found in t,Iieir own experience. PCC techniques-based on certificates which are computed outside the deviceconstitute a good scenario for the certification of software deployed in p e r nsive systems. They compute tamper-proof certificates which simplify code verification and pass them along with the code. In our abstract interpretation-based context, although global analysis is now routinely used as a practical tool, it is still unacceptable to run the whole analyzer to validate the certificate as it involves considerable cost. One of the main reasons is that the fixpoint algorithm is an iterative process which often computes answers (repeatedly) for the same call due to possible updates introduced by further computations. At each iteration, the algorithm has to manipulate rather complex data structures-which involve performing updates, lookups, etc.-until the fixpoint is reached. Luckily, in abstract interpretation-based code certification, the burden on the consumer side is reduced by using a simple onetraversal checker, which is a very simplified and efficient abstract interpreter which does not need to compute a fixpoint. The benchmark results in [l] show that the speedup achieved by the checking is approximately 1.63 in just analysis time which, we believe, makes our approach practically applicable in pervasive contexts.
A similar proposal is presented in 1171 to split the type-based bytecode verification of the KVM (an embedded variant of the JVM) in two phases, where the producer first computes the certificate by means of a type-based dataflow analyzer and then the consumer simply checks that the types provided in the code certificate are \.slid. This approach is extended in [13] to real world Java Software. As in our case, the validation can he done in a single, linear pass over the bytecode. However, these approaches are designed limited to types, whereas our approach supports a very rich set of domains especially well-suited for this purpose, including complex properties such as computational and memory cost, non-failure, determinacy, etc. (as we have seen in the examples in this section) and possibly even combining several of them.
Conclusions
Abstract interpretation-based verification forms the corner stone of the safety model of CiaoPP: the preprocessor of the Ciao multi-paradigm programming system. It ensures the integrity of the runtime environment even in the presence of untrusted code. The framework uses modular, incremental, abstract interpretation as a fundamental tool to infer information about programs. This information is used to certify and validate programs, to detect bugs with respect to partial specifications written using program assertions, to generate and simplify run-time tests and to perform high-level optimizations such as multiple abstract specialization, parallelization, and resource usage control. Among these applications, we herein focus on the use of abstract interpretation-based verification for the purpose of mobile code safety by following the standard PCC methodology. We report on some experiments in CiaoPP at work which illustrate how the actual process of program certification is aided in an implementation of this framework. We also discuss the application of abstract interpretation-based code certification to the area of pervasive computing systems, which may lack computing resources to perform static analysis. We point out that computational properties inferred by CiaoPP can be useful for controlling resource usage and filtering out mobile code which does not meet certain cost requirements. Also, the fact that our approach follows PCC techniques-in which the certificate is generated outside the devicemakes it potentially applicable in this pervasive context. However, controlling it in a perfect way proves far from obvious, and a range of challenging open problems remain as topics for further research.
For instance, we plan to study a more precise model of the memory requirements of small devices. The size of certificates needs to he minimized as much as possible to fit in such limited svstems. We believe that thev can
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